# 2025 Ransomware TTP Analysis: Virtualization and Data Theft Trends

> Analysis of shifting ransomware TTPs in 2025, highlighting the surge in data theft extortion, virtualization targeting, and exploitation of edge vulnerabilities.

- Published: 2026-03-16T16:30:36.000Z
- Severity: high
- Category: Threat Intel
- Tags: REDBIKE, CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-3400, LockBit, Akira, ESXi
- Author: Runtime Rebel Intel
- Primary source: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ransomware-ttps-shifting-threat-landscape/
- Canonical: https://runtimerebel.com/blog/2025-ransomware-ttp-analysis-virtualization-and-data-theft-trends

## Key points

- Immediate impact: Global organizations face record-high extortion posts as threat actors pivot toward data theft and targeting smaller enterprises.
- Affected systems: Critical vulnerabilities in edge devices from Fortinet, Palo Alto, and SonicWall, alongside VMware ESXi virtualization infrastructure.
- Remediation: Prioritize patching edge-facing networking devices and implement multi-factor authentication for all remote access portals to disrupt initial access.

## Analysis of Shifting Ransomware TTPs

According to [Google Threat Intelligence](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ransomware-ttps-shifting-threat-landscape/), the [Ransomware](/glossary#ransomware) landscape in 2025 is defined by a paradox: while overall profitability for threat actors appears to be declining, the volume of victims posted to Data Leak Sites (DLS) has reached record highs. This trend is driven by a [Ransomware-as-a-Service business model evolution 2025](/glossary#ttp) that has lowered the barrier to entry, even as law enforcement disruptions impact prolific groups like [LockBit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LockBit). 

Security professionals are observing a strategic pivot. As larger organizations improve their recovery capabilities, attackers are increasingly targeting smaller entities and shifting toward data-theft-only extortion. Mandiant investigations revealed that 77% of intrusions now involve suspected data theft, a sharp increase from 57% in 2024.

## Initial Access and Edge Exploitation

In one-third of analyzed incidents, the initial access vector was the exploitation of a [CVE](/glossary#cve). Threat actors continue to prioritize edge-facing infrastructure, particularly VPNs and firewalls. Common targets include [CVE-2024-55591](/cve/cve-2024-55591) and [CVE-2024-21762](/cve/cve-2024-21762) (Fortinet), [CVE-2024-40766](/cve/cve-2024-40766) (SonicWall), and [CVE-2024-3400](/cve/cve-2024-3400) (Palo Alto). 

There is also a notable rise in [Zero-Day](/glossary#zero-day) exploitation. For instance, UNC6357 was observed attempting to exploit [CVE-2025-53770](/cve/cve-2025-53770) and [CVE-2025-53771](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53771) in Microsoft SharePoint to deploy LOCKBIT.WARLOCK. Defenders should focus on **detecting ransomware exploitation of Fortinet VPN vulnerabilities** and similar edge exposures by auditing [C2](/glossary#c2) traffic and unusual authentication patterns on administrative interfaces.

## Mitigation Steps for Virtualization Infrastructure Ransomware

Perhaps the most significant technical shift is the maturing capability of threat actors to target virtualized environments. Approximately 43% of 2025 intrusions involved targeting virtualization infrastructure, primarily VMware ESXi. Attackers are moving beyond manual commands to automated scripts that can change root passwords, disable security policies, and execute payloads across multiple hypervisors simultaneously.

Key [TTP](/glossary#ttp) observations in virtual environments include:
*   **Exploitation of Hypervisor Vulnerabilities:** Use of [CVE-2024-37085](/cve/cve-2024-37085) to gain [Privilege Escalation](/glossary#privilege-escalation) on ESXi hosts.
*   **Automated Deployment:** Use of Python and Bash scripts to terminate virtual machines (VMs) and delete snapshots before encryption.
*   **Persistence via SSH:** Enabling SSH on ESXi hosts and using tunnelers like CHISEL or CLOUDFLARED to maintain access.

Establishing **mitigation steps for virtualization infrastructure ransomware** requires organizations to implement strict network segmentation between management interfaces and the broader network. Furthermore, the [SOC](/glossary#soc) must monitor for the disabling of the `ExecInstalledOnly` setting on ESXi hosts, which is a common precursor to executing custom ransomware binaries.

## Post-Compromise and Data Exfiltration

Once [Lateral Movement](/glossary#lateral-movement) is achieved, often via RDP or SMB, threat actors focus on data exfiltration. The use of Rclone was observed in 28% of confirmed data theft incidents. Actors are also increasingly using legitimate cloud storage services, such as MEGA and Azure, to stage stolen data. 

To hinder recovery, actors frequently perform [Privilege Escalation](/glossary#privilege-escalation) to disable [EDR](/glossary#edr) solutions and delete volume shadow copies. While the use of Cobalt Strike BEACON is declining (appearing in only 2% of incidents), it is being replaced by alternative frameworks like AdaptixC2 and Mythic. Defenders should utilize [SIEM](/glossary#siem) rules to detect unauthorized registry modifications that disable Windows Defender, as this remains a primary anti-detection tactic for families like REDBIKE and Akira.

**Related:** [Iranian APT Exploits Edge Vulnerabilities in US Infrastructure](/blog/iranian-apt-exploits-edge-vulnerabilities-in-us-infrastructure), [Community-Driven Intelligence Architectures and Virtualization Vulnerability Analysis](/blog/community-driven-intelligence-architectures-and-virtualization-vulnerability-analysis)

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