Token Theft and Session Hijacking: Mitigating Device Trust Failures

Technical Overview of Session Persistence Attacks

Modern authentication frameworks, including OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect (OIDC), rely on bearer tokens to maintain session state. While Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) effectively mitigates credential harvesting, it does not inherently prevent session hijacking. Threat actors increasingly utilize Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) proxies and Infostealer malware—such as RedLine, Racoon, and Lumma—to extract active session cookies and refresh tokens from the user’s browser memory or local storage.

By leveraging stolen tokens, attackers can bypass MFA requirements entirely, as the identity provider (IdP) perceives the request as a continuation of an already authenticated session. This technique, classified under MITRE ATT&CK T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie), shifts the security burden from the identity layer to the device and session management layers.

Limitations of Identity-Centric Security

Traditional Zero Trust implementations often over-index on user identity at the point of ingress. However, identity alone is an insufficient trust signal if the underlying endpoint is compromised. Attackers who gain administrative access to a managed device can perform process injection into browser instances or exfiltrate the Data Protection API (DPAPI) keys required to decrypt local cookie stores.

To counter these vectors, security architectures must transition toward continuous device verification. This involves validating endpoint health, patch levels, and hardware-backed integrity throughout the duration of the session, rather than only at the initial login. Organizations can identify blind spots in their session management and endpoint security posture by incorporating advanced tools like Pocket Pentest into their regular infrastructure scanning routines.

Implementation of Robust Access Controls

Securing access in the face of token theft requires the implementation of technical controls that bind sessions to specific hardware or network contexts:

• Token Binding (RFC 8471): Cryptographically links a security token to the TLS layer of the client-server connection, preventing tokens from being used on unauthorized devices.
• Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE): Allows IdPs to revoke active tokens in real-time based on telemetry changes, such as a change in IP reputation or device compliance status.
• Hardware-Bound Keys: Utilizing FIDO2/WebAuthn with resident keys ensures that the private key material used for authentication never leaves the hardware security module (HSM) or Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
• Conditional Access Policies (CAPs): Enforcing strict device compliance requirements where sessions are only granted if the device is managed via MDM/EDR and meets a defined security baseline.