Overview of Tajin Group Operations
Recent intelligence research published by Recorded Future details the operational mechanics of the Tajin Group (踏金集团), a Chinese-speaking threat syndicate specializing in phishing, payment card theft, financial fraud, and money laundering. Tajin Group functions as a high-tier third-party vendor within Chinese-language Telegram-based guarantee marketplaces, serving as a vital node in the broader cybercrime ecosystem.
Guarantee marketplaces have emerged as prominent alternatives to traditional dark web forums, providing escrow services, dispute resolution, and vendor accountability via cryptocurrency deposits. Tajin Group maintained a presence on the Dabai Guarantee marketplace before migrating its operations to the Xinbi Guarantee marketplace, adhering to ecosystem rules that restrict vendors from operating across multiple competing escrow platforms simultaneously.
Technical Details and Evolving TTPs
Advanced Operational Security (OPSEC)
To evade detection and maintain persistence across messaging platforms, Tajin Group and similar threat actors leverage specialized third-party services to acquire Telegram collectible usernames and anonymous virtual numbers. By bypassing traditional physical SIM card requirements, these operators link multiple digital identifiers to unified accounts, establishing scalable infrastructures for large-scale phishing and social engineering campaigns.
Financial Scale and Collateral
Vendor credibility within Telegram guarantee marketplaces is frequently measured by staked cryptocurrency deposits. While typical vendors stake modest amounts ranging from several hundred to a few thousand Tether (USDT), Tajin Group reported a substantial collateral deposit of 208,848 USDT on Xinbi Guarantee. This elevated financial commitment reflects a large-scale enterprise capable of sustaining high-volume carding operations and complex money laundering topologies involving 2D and 3D payment gateways.
Impact on Global Financial Systems
The activities of guarantee marketplace vendors directly threaten commercial banks, digital payment providers, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Because these marketplaces function as force multipliers for recruitment, resource sharing, and crowdsourced cybercriminal capabilities, successful operational models adopted by syndicates like Tajin Group are frequently replicated by competing threat groups globally.
Mitigations and Defensive Recommendations
Security teams and financial institutions should prioritize the following defensive postures:
- Enhance transaction monitoring rules to identify velocity anomalies associated with carding operations and fraudulent gateway interactions.
- Incorporate threat intelligence feeds that monitor emerging Telegram-based guarantee marketplaces and associated cryptocurrency wallet addresses linked to high-value escrow deposits.
- Implement strict behavioral analysis on inbound communications and authentication requests to detect credential harvesting and targeted phishing campaigns.
Related: UNC6671 Rebrands: Multi-Brand Vishing and Cloud Extortion, Talos Q2 2026 Report: Phishing and Living-off-the-Land Trends